Hi,

The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2024 Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories has brought into sharp focus the European Union’s obligations under international law. Among these is the duty of non-recognition, which requires the EU to ensure that its trade and economic relations do not contribute to the maintenance of an unlawful situation. This raises a constitutional question for the EU: On what legal basis should it adopt measures restricting trade with Israeli settlements in the occupied territories?

This week I’m in Victoria for the 2026 ECSA‑C Biennial Conference, where I’ll be presenting a new paper titled “Strategic Minerals, Divided Powers: Resource Federalism and Economic Security in Canada and the EU.” I thought I’d use this space to briefly introduce the paper and explain what I’ll be talking about on the panel.

I will be traveling to Canada’s Pacific coast in a couple of months to attend the bi-annual conference of the Canadian EU studies association. Among other things, I will participate in a panel on EU-Canada relations. The panel revisits last year's blog series on whether Canada should join the EU—a question now less fanciful than a year ago. My answer was no, it should not, because it cannot. If Canada cannot join the EU, another question arises however: how close can Canada get to the EU, assuming it wants to strengthen ties?

 In July 2025, the European Commission reached an agreement with the Trump administration to avert a potential trade war between two major global trading powers. The agreement, later called the ‘Turnberry deal’ because it was reached at the American president’s Scottish golf course, was one-sided. On the US side, it contained commitments not to raise tariffs further above a ceiling of 15%. On the EU side, it contained commitments to further lower tariffs on goods—in particular industrial goods, as well as certain agricultural goods such as, most notably, lobster.